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Historians of U.S. foreign relations have long focused on the 
decision-making processes, motivations, and negotiations of policymakers. 
Yet to understand the implementation of policy in a large democracy 
such as the United States, we must also comprehend how policymakers 
were able to acquire public consent for their policies-or at least avoid 
strong public opposition to them. How, for example, have policymakers 
been able to get Americans to support the decision to go to war, or 
conversely, to begin to see a hated enemy as a valuable ally? A specific 
instance of the latter was the post-World War II decision to make the 
recent enemy, Japan, into a valuable “junior ally” or “bulwark against 
communism” in East Asia.1) The political reasons for this policy have been 
straightforward: the Cold War was intensifying, and this caused the 
* An expanded version of this article will appear as a chapter in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Cold War,ed. Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde 
London: Oxford University Press: 2012). This abbreviated version appears 
with the permission of Oxford University Press.
1) For a fuller treatment of this topic, see: Naoko Shibusawa, America’s 
Geisha Ally (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
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United States to abandon earlier policies that had sought to 
democratize Japan and to make Japan pay for the damage it wreaked 
during its imperialist rampage throughout the Asia-Pacific region. 
U.S. policymakers reacted to the perceived communist threat by 
deciding to prioritize Japanese economic recovery to make Japan a 
model capitalist country in East Asia to the disadvantage of the Asian 
victims of Japanese imperialism. This “reverse course” was an about- 
face of policy, but the American public easily went along with this 
decision-why? This phenomenon is especially curious since Americans 
had come to hate Japan ferociously during the war. 
The answer is that elite policymakers were able to obtain broad 
popular support for their foreign policies by drawing upon long-standing 
narratives or ideologies in U.S. culture about Americans and non-Americans. 
Ideological thinking, therefore, helps explain how policymakers gain support 
for their foreign policies-in particular, support for drastic policy 
changes. “Ideology” or “ideological thinking” in this content is not 
meant to be an indictment, although the word “ideology” retains a 
negative connotation in the United States. Many continue to think of 
“ideology” as a pejorative-some continue to think of it as synonymous 
with Marxism, as was commonly believed during the Cold War. During 
the Cold War, American policymakers, mainstream intellectuals, and 
others believed that “ideology” was what the other side had: namely, 
“a system of wrong, false, distorted, or otherwise misguided beliefs.”2) 
What they themselves believed, Americans labeled simply as commonsense 
or “the truth.” But since the Cold War’s end, American scholars of American 
foreign relations have increasingly been better equipped to recognize 
2) Teun van Dijk, Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, 1998), 1-2.  
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that Americans have not been immune to ideological thinking. Viewing 
ideological thinking as an everyday characteristic of all peoples, 
rather than an unfortunate flaw of enemies, scholars such as Michael 
Latham have been able to argue that U.S. policies also operated with 
an ideology. During the Cold War, this was modernization theory.3) 
Latham and others can make such arguments because they defined 
ideology in a way similar to Michael H. Hunt, who called it an 
“interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the 
complexity of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible 
terms and suggests an appropriate way of dealing with that reality.”4)
To clarify the concept even further, we should note that ideologies 
are not simply any interrelated set of beliefs that suggest paths of 
action. They are integral to what Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci 
called the “cultural hegemony.” Gramsci concluded that elite classes 
held control by consent of the ruled through a cultural hegemony, by 
which he meant the everyday narratives and ideas that make the 
socio-political hierarchies and economic inequities appear natural and 
commonsensical. An example of a “naturalized” narrative in the United 
States is the prevailing idea that it is “the land of opportunity,” 
where anyone possessing determination and a strong work ethic can 
“make it” and attain financial success. Americans continue to believe 
this story, even though statistics tell us that social mobility is much 
more limited than people are led to believe by American media, 
3) Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and 
‘Nation Building’ in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000); David C. Engerman, et al., eds., Staging Growth: 
Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).
4) Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987).
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movies, school lessons, and handed-down tales. Since these naturalized 
narratives serve the powerful, they can be characterized as “elite 
ideologies.” But it is important to keep in mind that these naturalized 
narratives or elite ideologies are not a result of a vast conspiracy by 
ruling elites to hoodwink the poor and disempowered. Instead, they 
are deeply held beliefs shared by many within a society, regardless of 
socioeconomic status. And though these belifes ultimately benefit the 
ruling elites, the elites themselves find the ideologies compelling 
because they cannot be “beyond” ideologies any more than they can be 
beyond their own cultures.5) Dominant or elite ideologies, then, are a 
subset of culture-defined here as a discursive system. This culture or 
discursive system shifts as a small number of counter-hegemonic 
narratives succeed in challenging the veracity and “common sense” of 
dominant ideologies.6)
Therefore, this essay on the role of ideologies in gathering consent 
for policies examines the ongoing process of reproducing hegemonic 
knowledge. Although ideologies are neither monolithic nor unchanging, 
the narratives that have shaped and buttress U.S. policy derive from 
5) What Gramcsi called “cultural hegemony” is not equivalent to political 
scientist Joseph Nye’s notion of “soft power.” As Randolph B. Persaud has 
pointed out, “soft power” suggests a purely utilitarian tool-as if cultural 
hegemonic power is “something done to others, out there in the wider 
world,” rather than an ongoing process that describes the way the United 
States or any state functions. Nye’s advocacy of “soft power” is a strategy 
for those who want to rally, maintain, and even further American power 
abroad. Randolph B. Persaud, “Shades of American Hegemony: The 
Primitive, the Enlightened, and the Benevolent,” Connecticut Journal of 
International Law (Spring 2004): 268-270.
6) For example, feminists and women’s rights advocates pushed the discourse 
such that it is now “common sense” that women are capable of more 
responsibilities and skills than in the past.
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a longer genealogy of western imperialism that continues today.7) Notions 
of modernity-especially in rationalizing the capability of self-rule-took 
shape during the Enlightenment, inflected Cold War policies, and 
continue to influence policy in our contemporary moment. A variety of 
ideologies regarding race, gender, and maturity were involved in this 
process, as well as other narratives about revolution, political economy, 
and religion. I argue that the staying power of ideologies derives from 
their personification into binary, anthropomorphic figures. This is how 
an entire country could be depicted and acted upon as if it were a 
singular, developing human being.
READINESS FOR SELF-RULE
Since the age of Enlightenment, the denial of political freedom and 
economic justice has been possible with a series of rationalizations that 
have been sustained in one form or another. Although an espousal in 
the “natural rights of man” should be a detriment to racialized 
colonization, westerners simply invented a range of rationalizations as 
to why some people did not meet the qualifications of manhood. Or, to 
put it another way, they came up with reasons as to why some humans 
were not really adults capable of self-rule or ready to appreciate the 
social and political freedoms promised by modernity. 
Apart from race, two other criteria to determine readiness for 
self-rule were also biologically based: gender and maturity. By virtue 
of their gender, of course, women did not fit into the category of “all 
7) See the argument in Kevin Hoskins, The Wages of Empire: ‘Cuba Libre,’ 
and U.S. Imperialism, Ph.D. dissertation (Brown University, forthcoming).
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men.” But why gender was and continues to be the basis for exclusion 
and disempowerment is less apparent. To talk about gender does not 
mean a focus on women as subjects per se, but the perceived differences 
between the males and females beyond biological differences. This 
perception of difference has been common throughout many societies 
and eras-so common that the differences appear innate rather than as 
a consequence of socialization. Magnifying the supposed differences in 
temperament and thus ability between the genders signified relationships 
of power, as Joan Scott pointed out.8) Thus power differences among 
nations have often been expressed through gendered references implying 
weakness, dependence, emotionality, and irrationality on one side and 
strength, rationality, and discipline on the other. 
Gender is a malleable ideology-indeed this versatility is what gives 
any ideology its resilience and utility. Pundits and policymakers have 
frequently resorted to gendered metaphors to explain differentials in 
power and to argue for the subjugation or “mentorship” of another 
people. For example, the feminized rendering of occupied Germany by 
Americans after World War II was relatively brief in comparison to 
American notions of a feminized Japan or an effeminate India that 
predated the war and continued throughout the twentieth century.9) 
By virtue of being non-western, the latter two nations were and are 
often orientalized as being feminine in culture-and by extension, as a 
people. Scholars who have expanded Edward Said’s original thesis with 
8) Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American 
Historical Review 91, no. 5 (December 1986): 1053-1075.
9) See Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 
1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Naoko Shibusawa, America’s 
Geisha Ally:  Reimagining the Japanese Enemy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006); Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and 
India, 1947-1964 (Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 2000).
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a gendered analysis have demonstrated that gendered visions underlay 
notions about the exoticism (and eroticism) of the “Other.”10)
Just as importantly, a gendered perspective frames what pundits 
and policymakers have thought not only of other peoples, but also of 
themselves. Thus those who advocated war with Spain in 1898 derided 
William McKinley as an old woman when he hesitated about entering 
the conflict, while sixty years later, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
favored “toughness” to disastrous consequences in Vietnam.11) At the 
same time, the gendered self-image included a conviction that one’s 
own society treated women better than other “less advanced” peoples. 
This notion can be seen in the Americas as early as Cabeza de Vaca’s 
observation in the sixteenth-century that the indios worked their 
women too hard, but was often repeated during the Cold War and 
beyond regarding Asian men’s treatment of Asian women.12) Since the 
10) For example: Reina Lewis, Gendering Orientalism: Race, Femininity and 
Representation (New York:Routledge, 1995); Meyda Yegenoglu, Colonial 
Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Mari Yoshihara, Embracing the East: 
White Women and American Orientalism (New York:Oxford University 
Press, 2002); Rana Kabbani, Imperial Fictions: Europe’s Myths of Orient 
(London: Saqi Books, 2008); Mary Roberts, Intimate Outsiders: The Harem 
in Ottoman and Orientalist Art and Travel Literature (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2008).
11) Kristin L Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics 
Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American War (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1998); Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender 
and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy. (Amherst, MA: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2001). 
12) lvar Núñez Cabeza De Vaca, Chronicle of the Narvaez Expedition (New York: 
Penguin Classics, 2002); Katharine H. S. Moon, Sex Among Allies (New 
York Columbia University Press, 1997); Ji-Yeon Yuh, Beyond the Shadow 
of Camptown: Korean Military Brides in America. (New York:NYU Press, 
2004); Dorinne Kondo, About Face: Performing Race in Fashion and 
Theater. (New York: Routledge, 1997); Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally.
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end of the Cold War the trend is visible in American popular 
discourse about Muslim societies.13) This gendered rationale helped 
justify wars on Iraq and Afghanistan, and has tragically brought more 
suffering, particularly upon Afghani women.14) 
Likewise, the ideology of maturity has helped to deny self-determination, 
usually to nonwhites. Analogies corresponding to the natural life cycle 
have long been used as conceptual devices to justify political privilege 
and dominance. “Maturity” signified ability, wisdom, self-control, and 
entitlement to status and power. Colonial powers have used the 
rhetoric of maturity to justify their rule over non-white peoples. 
Images of the Filipinos, Cubans, Hawaiians, or Puerto Ricans as 
babies-often squalling-or as students in a classroom led by “Uncle 
Sam” were abundant in American media at the turn of the 20th 
century.15) In the words of William Howard Taft, the first governor-general 
of the Philippines, “our little brown brothers,” would require “fifty or 
one hundred years” of U.S. supervision “to develop anything resembling 
Anglo-Saxon political principles and skills.”16) This practice of depicting 
13) Kelly Shannon, Veiled Intention: Islam, Global Feminism, and U.S. Foreign 
Policy since the late 1970s, Ph.D. dissertation (Philadelphia: Temple University, 
2010). 
14) RAWA, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, a 
group formed to broadcast the misogynistic abuses of the Taliban, argue 
that the presence of U.S. forces worsened the safety of Afghani women.  
See: http://www.rawa.org/index.php. Iraqi feminist Yanar Mohammed 
likewise argues that the Obama administration has not improved the dire 
straits in which Iraqi women find themselves and that the re-imposition 
of sharia law in Iraq diminished the minimal rights women enjoyed under 
Saddam. http://www.democracynow.org
/2010/3/19/seven_years_of_war_on_anniversary.
15) See the cartoons from the era of the Philippine-American War collected in 
Abe Ignacio, et al., The Forbidden Book (San Francisco: T’Boli, 2004).
16) Quoted in Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American 
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colonized or otherwise disempowered peoples as immature or even 
helpless “dependents” needing the firm hand of American guidance 
continued into the twentieth century and beyond. 
<Figure 1> “Not Yet Ready to Walk Alone,” Jacksonville 
(Florida) Times, February 1949
Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1984), 134.
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<Figure 2> “Iraq’s Baby Steps,” Ventura County Star, February 2005
Unlike race or gender, however, immaturity could be a transitional 
stage, not a permanent fate. After World War II, when the United 
States focused on exerting hegemonic power without formal colonial 
structures, it took more seriously its and other imperialist powers’ 
false promises to bestow freedom when the natives “grew up.” 
American policymakers and media justified the country’s occupation of 
Japan as necessary because the Japanese were “not yet ready to walk 
alone.” Still, they were not expected to be under direct American 
“tutelage” forever, and indeed, after seven years of occupation, the 
Japanese regained their national sovereignty. Contrasting sharply with 
permanent colonial paternalism, this “liberal paternalism” was 
selectively applied during the postwar period-again, according to a 
sliding scale of perceived readiness for self-rule.17) 
17) Shibusawa,America’s Geisha Ally, 54-95. Nonetheless, American policymaking 
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The ideologies of race, gender, and maturity were and are mutually 
reinforcing. Stereotypes or notions about women, nonwhites, and 
children not only overlapped, but also provided rationales for the 
others. Women were considered weak, weepy, and emotional like 
children. Children enjoyed frivolities and were fey like women. 
Nonwhites were deemed undisciplined, unschooled, and ignorant like 
children. Children were portrayed as “little savages” (and literally 
believed to be so, according to turn-of-the-century recapitulation 
theory).18) On the other side of the binary, then, were notions of 
white adult men being cool, levelheaded, responsible decision-makers. 
The interlocking characteristic of the ideologies explains their 
strength and, indeed, can add up to a simplified worldview that 
bifurcates people into those who should be in control and those who 
should be controlled.
DEVELOPMENT, CIVILIZATION, AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Also constituting this simplified, binary-based worldview have been 
other ideologies having little to do with biological difference. Instead, 
they were based upon nationalism and fear of revolutions, as Hunt 
discusses in Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, as well as free trade, 
Christianity, and western civilization or modernity.19) That free trade 
and Christianity can be seen as an “interrelated set of convictions” 
elites selectively applied liberal paternalism.
18) Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender 
and Race in the United States, 1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996).
19) I am not discussing the notion of “alternative modernities” because I am not 
convinced that the western, universalist bias can be eliminated by this concept.
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about how to understand and act in the world is self-evident and need 
not be explained further here.20) Western civilization or modernity 
functions as an ideology because it assumes that western civilization is 
the historical apex of human achievement in the arts, the academy, 
jurisprudence, governance, economic productivity, civic institutions, 
and society. It is the universal standard to which all other peoples 
should aspire-and indeed, be helped to do so under the direction and 
mentorship of westerners. This ideology, from which modernization 
theory sprang, has deep historical roots that date to the period of 
European overseas imperialism.21) Notions about development intrinsic 
to the ideology of civilization, moreover, have underlain the 
nationalist narrative of the United States: American exceptionalism. It 
is through the prism of this teleological narrative of destiny and 
progress that Americans-both leaders and the broad public-have 
understood their nation’s ascendancy to power and global role.
The ideology of American exceptionalism explained to Americans why 
they were particularly suited, even destined, to be world leaders, but 
also that they must be ever vigilant in maintaining their fitness. 
American exceptionalism held that America was founded by healthy, 
young, vital, and hardworking people who freed themselves from the 
shackles of European/British imperialism and acquired control of a 
largely empty continent that was abundant in natural resources. This 
settler-colonial narrative dates from the 1780s and 1790s when it 
20) For further discussion see Diane Kirby, “Religion,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
the Cold War, ed. by Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (London: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming).  This volume is already cited in the 
first footnote.
21) For further discussion of western civilization as an ideology, see Federici, 
Enduring Western Civilization: The Construction of the Concept of Western 
Civilization and Its “Others” (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995). 
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offered an attractive national identity to counteract the centripetal 
forces pulling apart the new nation after the successful revolution. The 
American Revolution became not simply the action of aggrieved 
provincials, but “a shot heard around the world”-the first sound in a 
noble fight for human liberty. Over time, “Americans-white Americans 
especially-came to see the founding of free and equal people as their 
calling in the world.”22) But Americans also believed that this 
exemplary status had to be maintained-through constant movement, 
said Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893-lest they lapse into senescence 
and enervation. Thus, John Foster Dulles stated in 1950: “There may 
come a time in the life of a people when their work of creation ends. 
That hour has not struck for us. We are still vital and capable of great 
endeavor. Our youth are spirited, not soft or fearful.”23) Dulles’ 
statements demonstrate that notions about the developmental lifespan 
of civilizations were also gendered and raced.24) The “spirited” and 
“not soft” youth Dulles invoked were of a specific gender and race, not 
to mention age. Such notions help explain why, a decade later, Sargent 
Shriver and the Kennedy administration fretted about American youth 
and believed that the Peace Corps would help young Americans 
experience the “frontier” life-style and “ retain what Theodore Roosevelt 
had called “the barbarian virtues” at the turn of the century.25) 
Stemming from Jeffersonian republican fears of “overdevelopment” and 
effeminization of American society, preserving “vitality” and “vigor” 
22) Joyce Appleby, “Recovering America’s Historic Diversity: Beyond Exceptionalism,” 
Journal of American History 79 (Sept. 1992): 419-431.
23) Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally, 90.
24) Bederman, Manliness &Civilization.
25) Dean, Imperial Brotherhood; Fritz Fischer, Making Them Like Us (Washington, 
DC: Smithsonian, 1998).
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(usually at the expense of the indigenous) remained a concern among 
policymakers since “the closing of the frontier.”26) 
Thus the existential stakes in spreading the “blessings of our 
liberty”-i.e., spreading U.S. liberal economic systems and/or democratic 
institutions, especially to “Third World” natives-made the struggle 
with the Soviet Union especially charged ideologically. The struggle 
symbolized not only the opposition of capitalism and communism but 
also competing exceptionalist claims.27) Marxism and liberalism, both 
economic and political, came from the same Enlightenment lineage. As 
such, adherents saw their chosen way as universal and following a 
single trajectory of development over time. Although W. W. Rostow 
meant his “Non-Communist Manifesto” to be the antithesis of Marx’s, 
they both believed that there existed a singular model of economic 
growth towards modernity.28) The Soviets and the Americans disagreed, 
of course, over whether capitalism or socialism was the final epoch of 
history or the best way to attain “modernity.” Yet both modernization 
theory and Marxist theory were universalist, secular, devoted to 
science, and materialist. Both held that “men” could shape the world, 
and both believed that democracy was best protected and run by 
elites-whether they be John F. Kennedy and the “best and the 
brightest” or Nikita Khrushchev and the Communist Party. Moreover, 
they purported to champion anti-colonial struggles and racial equality, a 
claim the United States became better at arguing as the Civil Rights 
26) ]See Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian 
America (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
27) Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the 
Making of Our Times (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 39.
28) W.W. Rostow, “The Stages of Economic Growth,” The Economic History Review 
12:1 (1959): 1-16.
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movement gained victories. Likewise, both the Americans and the Soviets 
viewed national governments that either disagreed or resisted their 
particular favored path to modernity-communist or liberal capitalist-as 
problems to be solved either through appeasement or elimination.29)
The “tragedy of American diplomacy,” according to William Appleman 
Williams, was that the exceptionalist narrative undermined U.S. commitment 
to democracy and self-determination for the “Others.” He recognized 
that Americans had a deep-felt commitment to democracy and wished 
to share this system with the world, but that by also insisting that 
other people attain and practice democracy in ways sanctioned by the 
United States, Americans undermined the very principle of self- 
determination they sought to promote. This has meant either 
overthrowing or trying to overthrow “uncooperative” national 
leaders-including those that were popularly elected-and often 
installing undemocratic leaders whose policies aligned with the 
interests of the United States. American leaders were not always 
comfortable with the choices they had made, but not uncomfortable 
enough to undo their decisions. JFK stated that while a best case 
scenario for a Third World country was “a decent democracy,” he 
believed that if the United States were not given that choice, “a 
Trujillo regime” had to be supported in order to prevent “a Castro 
regime.” And although the U.S. State Department “blanched” at the 
bloodshed and sheer violence of their brutal clients in Guatemala, 
they still did not recommend a policy change.30)
29) For instance, the two rival powers either supported or attacked, either 
directly or covertly, the governments of Cuba, Guatemala, Chile, Nicaragua, 
North or South Vietnam, North or South Korea, South Africa, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. See Westad, Global Cold War.
30) Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War 
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Modernization theory failed to acknowledge what the peoples of 
Guatemala and elsewhere knew from experience: exploitation from 
imperialism and capitalism. The word “justice” does not appear in 
Rostow’s “The Stages of Economic Growth.”31) The theory denied the 
historical relationship between poorer and richer countries, and 
instead looked at each state as if it were hermetically sealed in order 
to determine when it was ready for “take-off.” Modernization theory 
was thus compatible with authoritarian governance by drawing on a 
paternalist and racist rhetoric that categorized non-whites as 
children, needing a firm strongman to maintain order.32) And the 
grinding poverty and cycles of violent political unrest undergirded 
American perceptions that nations of the Third World/Global South 
needed guidance by the “advanced” nations. 
The continued poverty and “instability” of the Third World/Global 
South persist as a legacy of colonialism, but in ways that appear to 
reaffirm the notions of the western and/or wealthy, industrial powers 
that the decolonized are not yet ready for self-rule. In The Wretched 
of the Earth, Frantz Fanon explained that intractable problems ensue 
after the achievement of state independence because the native 
leadership ended up reinforcing existing hierarchies established by the 
former colonialist rulers. Natives (often interracial mestizos), who were 
given a slightly privileged place in the colonial order, were the 
technicians, the teachers, the clerks, and the other low to middling 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
31) Rostow, “The Stages of Economic Growth.” 
32) David F Schmitz, Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States and 
Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999); Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing 
Dictatorships, 1965-1989 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 
2006).
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functionaries that made the colony run smoothly. They lacked the 
education, training, and most certainly the capital resources to run a 
successful business enterprise-especially a new one based on a more 
equitable model. They therefore simply repeated or tried to reproduce 
the same productive models from the colonial days, and thus failed to 
diversify the economy and go by what has always worked in their 
experience. Moreover, the new nation was now shut out from the 
reliable, if dependent and peripheral, position in the colonial power’s 
economic system.33) Some, like Haiti, were impoverished by having to 
pay an indemnity at gunpoint to its former colonial overlords for the 
losses they incurred with Haitian independence. Haitian scholar Alex 
Dupuy has pointed out that as a result of colonialism’s social and 
economic relations and structures, the new Haitian elites were thus 
unable to maintain the plantation system, much less create an 
industrial infrastructure. This meant that they turned to commerce, to 
the import and export of goods. Haiti therefore made its wealth from 
circulation, not production, and it was vulnerable to the fluctuations of 
the world market. Moreover, the ruling elites were not a homogeneous 
monolith, but fragmented groups, constantly in competition, creating 
and perpetuating instability and authoritarian rule.34) 
Because most American policymakers have not been fully cognizant 
of the deep historical-and man-made-roots to such poverty and 
cycles of violence, they have not trusted the colonized or decolonized 
to handle liberalism, either economic or political. American leaders, 
and most American citizens, believe that economic liberalism (the 
33) Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2005), 
97-144.
34) Alex Dupuy, Haiti In The World Economy: Class, Race, And Underdevelopment 
Since 1700 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).
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capitalist system) best fostered political liberalism (democracy), and 
vice versa. The tricky question has always been: which one should 
come first? Lack of confidence in the colonized/recently decolonized 
nonwhite peoples-and a healthy dose of vested material interests-has 
meant that U.S. policy almost invariably supports efforts to ensure 
that economic liberalism is fostered and maintained, often times at 
the expense of political liberalism. And the rationale to prioritize 
economic liberalism over political liberalism has posited the former as 
a necessary developmental step: economic liberalism (or “free trade,” 
or “globalization”) will bring investment; investments will create jobs; 
the jobs will make the people industrious and create a strong civic 
society; the existence of a strong civic society will lay the foundation 
for democracy. But forgotten or neglected in this logical scheme is 
that nothing requires these jobs to be good jobs, with worker safety, 
good wages, and worker benefits-elements all necessary for a strong 
civic society by creating a sizeable and prosperous middle class. 
Moreover, as we know, efforts to make the jobs into good jobs were 
and continue to be brutally suppressed.35) Therefore, an essential link 
from capital investment to democracy has often been missing. As 
workers of the Global South have been telling us, democratic rights 
must be honored in order to ensure democracy and the establishment of 
democratic institutions. Capitalist development in and of itself does not 
bring democracy. We in the Global North cannot seem to hear this 
35) Aviva Chomsky, Linked Labor Histories: New England, Colombia, and the 
Making of a Global Working Class (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 
For instance, in 2008, 76 trade unionists were murdered worldwide, with 
49 in Colombia alone. Gustavo Capdevila, “Labor: Colombia Still Leads in 
Trade Unionist Murders,” Inter Press Service/Global Information Network 
(IPS/GIN) wire, 10 June 2009, 
http://www.globalinfo.org/eng/reader.asp?ArticleId=65408.
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message sufficiently, if at all.
This essay has argued that ideological narratives, including nationalist 
founding myths, must be considered in order to understand the 
worldviews that guided and continue to guide policy. This belief that 
America still serves as a beacon to the world is manifest in the 
inaugural address of President Barack Obama: 
And so, to all other peoples and governments who are watching 
today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my 
father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and 
every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and 
dignity, and we are ready to lead once more. 36)
Obama’s address is a paean to American exceptionalism. The theme 
of “only in America” resounded in Obama’s addresses and in media 
commentaries leading up to the election and inauguration.37) To the 
surprise of country music fans who recalled George W. Bush using the 
same song in 2004, Obama chose Brooks and Dunn’s song, “Only in 
America” to close his DNC nomination acceptance speech.38) For a 
36) “Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address,” New York Times, January 20, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html.
37) During his speech on race given on March 18, 2008, Obama asserted that 
“in no other country on Earth is my story even possible.” The text of the 
speech can be found at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23690567/. David 
Berreby reminds us, however, that other nations have elected heads of 
state from “stigmatized ethnic minorities or ‘foreign’ enclaves,” including: 
Britain, Peru, India, andKenya. David Berreby, “Only in America? The 
wrongheaded American beliefthat Barack Obama could only happen here,” 
Slate Magazine, posted 17 November 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2204822/.  First name needed when mentioned in 
note itself?
38) “Obama Uses Brooks &Dunn’s ‘Only in America; to Close Convention 
Speech,” CMT Blog, posted 28 August 2008, 
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presidential nominee committed to uniting a “blue and red America”- 
and trying to get elected-this strategy made sense. As the new 
president, however, he spoke to the wider, global audience and said: 
“To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to 
make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved 
bodies and feed hungry minds.”39)
Every president since Truman has made a similar commitment. 
Some can argue that certain administrations were more sincere in this 
commitment than others. As Williams recognized, the impulse to help 
others spoke to a generosity among Americans, though this quality 
has been hardly exclusive to Americans. What has been unique is the 
global reach or hegemonic power of the United States. There have 
always been dissidents and moments of greater dissidence. Yet the 
majority of Americans have tended to see their hegemony as 
benevolent. It is a conviction that comes from an exceptionalist 
ideology about the nation’s historic mission in the world. And it helps 
to explain how U.S. policymakers and pundits can moralize and 
dictate to poorer countries that they embrace free trade when the 
United States and Europe have more protectionist measures on their 
agricultural products than the entire Global South combined.40)
After 9/11, Americans became increasingly aware of a global current 
of hostility directed toward them. Uninformed of Cold War history, 
many remain confused as to why this might be so. Or perhaps 
http://blog.cmt.com/2008-08-29/obama-uses-brooks-dunns-only-in-ameri
ca-to-close-convention-speech/.
39) “Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address.”
40) Persaud, “Shades of American Hegemony,” 273. See also: Ha-Joon Chang, 
Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of 
Capitalism (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2007).
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informed by a Cold War history that focuses largely on the struggle 
with the Soviet Union, they forget the violence unleashed during this 
period on the peoples of the poorer and poorest nations on earth. And 
they do not understand the patterns of colonialism predating the Cold 
War that created the “Third World.” To be sure, some Americans are 
quite aware and critical of the U.S. foreign policies that propel the 
current grievances.41) Yet many Americans persist on thinking 
otherwise-that it might be “a clash of civilizations” or perhaps 
something intrinsic to the United States. Obama reinforced this stance 
by pronouncing also at his inauguration: “We will not apologize for 
our way of life nor will we waver in its defense.” Saying that the 
United States will be steadfast in defending the “American way of 
life”-a familiar phrase from the Cold War-continues to deflect 
attention from actual U.S. policies in the world. What’s best for 
America or, more accurately, for elite Americans, has not been what’s 
best for most people in America or the world. Most Americans do not 
know this or, perhaps, do not want to know this. It does not fit the 
stories we Americans have been telling about ourselves.
41) For instance, see Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, 
the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004). 
Even Osama bin Laden cites U.S. policies-support for “Israeli tanks in 
Palestine,” the WWII bombing of Japan, and economic sanctions on Iraq 
that starved millions of children. See Osama bin Laden, “Speech on 
September 11 Attacks,” 7 October 2001, reprinted in Joanne Meyerowitz, 
ed., History and September 11th (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
2003),244-245.
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Abstract




This article argues that elite policymakers gain broad public 
support for their foreign policies by drawing upon long-standing 
ideologies or narratives circulating within U.S. public discourse or 
culture. These ideologies are the mutually constituent elements of a 
nationalist self-image that not only helps differentiate Americans 
from non-Americans, but also serves to justify U.S. hegemonic power. 
The staying power of ideologies derives from the personification of 
nations into binary, anthropomorphic figures.
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